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ABSTRACT 
 
DO COUNTRIES WITH MORE BUSINESS-FRIENDLY ENVIRONMENTS 
RECEIVE MORE AID?: EVIDENCE FROM PANEL DATA OF 120 COUNTRIES 
 
By 
 
HAN, AHREUM 
 
 
This study verifies whether the current aid allocation practice gives a priority to the 
business environment of aid receiving nations. Since traditional aid practice has registered 
many unsuccessful results over the last couple of decades, author believe that strengthening 
the private sector with aid in developing countries is one of good attempts to lift those 
countries from poverty. Econometric estimations with panel data of 120 developing countries 
from 2007 to 2012 indicate that the recent aid practice has not much changed from the past 
practice. Donors respond mainly to the recipients’ economic and physical needs, represented 
by income level, infant mortality and population, rather than considering the aid’s value for 
money. In addition, the finding regarding government effectiveness is inconsistent with the 
existing claim that aid should be allocated more to countries with sound policies and 
institutions. This paper suggests that donor states carefully consider the soundness of 
business polices of a recipient country as a prime determinant when selecting where to give 
aid. Furthermore, donor countries should deliberately design how to utilize their aid resources 
to strengthen the business policies and regulations for recipient countries. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
This study aims to verify whether the current aid allocation practice gives a priority to the 
business environment of aid receiving nations. The term “aid” for the purpose of this study, refers 
only to Official Development Assistance (ODA). According to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), ODA is defined as official financing to the developing 
countries that includes at least a 25 percent of grant element to promote economic prosperity and 
welfare of developing world.1 
This study analyzes panel data of 120 developing countries from 2007 to 2012 to assess 
whether the current ODA is allocated efficiently by aid agencies including the members of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), multilateral institutions, and non-DAC countries to 
foster a pro-business climate within recipient countries. It will also recommend that donor 
countries set the level of business-friendly environment as a significant criterion when they select 
recipients to distribute funds for better aid effectiveness. The outcome of the study can be 
instrumental in improving ODA policy design in aid allocation. 
 
1.2 Defining the Problem  
Traditional aid has been channeled primarily through projects that are concerned with 
education, health, and food but not necessarily aimed at strengthening the private sector in aid 
recipient countries as a means of economic development. This traditional aid practice has 
registered many unsuccessful results over the last couple of decades. Therefore, new attempts to 
find more efficient way to end poverty in economically lagging countries are necessary.  
                                                 
1 "Official Development Assistance – Definition and Coverage." Aid Statistics - OECD. Accessed June 28, 2014. 
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Effective use of aid starts from efficient allocation of aid. One of the most efficient ways to 
distribute aid resources is giving it to the recipient countries which have a free doing-business 
climate because sound business regulations are crucial for a thriving private sector, and a thriving 
private sector is essential for overall prosperity. In the developing world, it is known that the 
private sector provides the largest employment, almost 90 percent of jobs.2 In addition, there is a 
growing consensus that the quality of business regulation and institutions are critical determinants 
of a country’s advancement. In this context, the World Bank Group developed a new strategy for 
tapping private initiatives to reduce poverty in 2002. Since then countries are annually ranked on 
their business environment status by the World Bank, through measuring countries’ regulatory 
environment to start and operate of a firm. It was discovered that cumbersome regulation is 
related with inefficiency of public institutions, which generally results in lower productivity 
(Djankov et. al. 2004). Hubbard and Duggan (2009) also support this claim by highlighting the 
role of private sector. They argue that the aid should be allocated to the private sector which can 
put the aid resources to good use, just as we saw with the Marshall plan, a successful program 
because it put the aid resources directly to the private sector. Even though aid should flow into the 
aid-recipient government with good economic policies and institutions for better aid effectiveness, 
the donors do not seem to consider much about the beneficiaries’ doing business conditions in the 
current aid giving practice.   
 
1.3 Significance of Solving the Issue  
The volume of aid given by DAC has been declining since 2010 in both nominal and real 
terms. What is more, many developed countries are reluctant to increase their aid amount due to 
the 2008 global crisis and subsequent recession. In this context, it is urgently needed to use the 
available total aid amount in an efficient way. The most efficient way is disbursing the funds 
                                                 
2 World Bank. IFC Jobs Study: Assessing Private Sector Contributions to Job Creation and Poverty Reduction. 
Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2013. 
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directly to the recipient countries’ private sectors that drive economic growth, and invite 
investment to create employment and raise incomes. Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al 
(2001) discover that institutions are important determinants of prosperity and growth in a long 
term. Furthermore, it is empirically proved that a 2.3 percentage point increase in annual growth 
can be achieved if business regulations are enhanced from the worst quartile to the best (Djankov 
et al. 2006). In this context, the business environment must not be overlooked when aid is 
allocated. Despite its significance, there have been little studies to analyze whether aid is made 
available to the countries where it is well used for the private sector, and where business 
environment is favorable to business activities. In this study, the important role of the private 
sector with regard to aid will be highlighted, and the current aid-giving practice in relation to the 
recipient states’ business climate will be analyzed.  
 
1.4 Hypothesis to Be Tested  
The null hypothesis of this study is that the donor-states disburse more aid funds to the 
recipient countries which enact more business-friendly policies. Since it has been proved by 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) and many others that aid is more effective in counties which have 
good policies and institutions, this paper would suggest to donors that they distribute more aid 
funds to those which have better private sector economic conditions if the null hypothesis is 
rejected.  
 
1.5 Methodology and Data 
The empirical work of this study is based on the data of 120 countries from 2007 to 2012, 
mainly taken from the World Bank database and OECD statistics. Quantitative tests, including 
Least Squares Regression, Breusch-Pagan test, Hausman specification test, and fixed- and 
random-effects GLS regression, are carried out to seek relationships between the volume of ODA 
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inflow to economically lagging countries and private sector condition indicators, such as entry and 
exit to the business market, openness of the market, number of new businesses registered, and 
domestic credit to the private sector in aid receiving countries.  
 
1.6 Structure of the Content 
The background of the study was stated in chapter one in detail. The rest of the paper is 
structured as follows: Chapter two is a literature review on previous aid allocation related to both 
theoretical and empirical studies, including Burnside and Dollar (2000), Hubbard and Dugan 
(2009), and Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen (2003), and many others. Chapter three 
introduces how hypotheses are developed, and chapter four elaborates on the methodology and 
various data used for the tests, and subsequently discusses the results of the regression analysis. 
The Conclusion is followed in chapter five.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
It is still debatable whether the aid is making contributions to poverty reduction or not 
(Radelet 2006). There are many studies trying to answer the questions that aid is an effective 
means of alleviating poverty, and many people also make incessant efforts to suggest appropriate 
remedies for poverty eradication. Nevertheless, ODA often encounters criticisms for not having 
contributed to economic growth. There are many possible determinants that hamper aid 
effectiveness. Some consider that the aid effectiveness is largely dependent on recipient countries’ 
conditions, while others reckon that donors should take responsibility for inefficient aid 
distribution. Among many reasons determining the effectiveness of aid, this paper is paying 
special attention to previous studies that have found the main cause for poor aid effectiveness as 
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being inefficient aid allocation by aid givers. Elements that hinder aid effectiveness are 
categorized into three parts: 1) Recipient Countries’ Bad Conditions, 2) Donors’ Interests, and 3) 
Wrong Sector Distributions.  
 
2.1 Recipient Countries’ Bad Conditions  
Burnside and Dollar (2000) investigate the interactions among macroeconomic policies, aid 
and growth. They discovered through an empirical test that aid would be more effective if it is 
aimed at governments with sound institutions and policies, suggesting that more aid be allocated 
to such governments. However, their research lacks evidence that aid leads to the adoption of 
good policies. The World Bank’s estimates also find out that a $10 billion rise in foreign aid 
influx would help 25 million people per year escape from poverty if aid targets countries with 
good governance, while it would lift only 7 million people per year from poverty if aid is 
indifferent to the economic policies and institutions (World Bank 1998). Pack & Pack (1993) and 
Feyzioglu et al. (1998) show that aid is relatively fungible, indicating that the recipient 
government spends the aid money arbitrarily, departing from originally intended purposes. The 
fungibility not only makes it difficult for donors and recipients to challenge the poverty, but also 
results in unfair distribution of income. This provides the government with additional resources to 
reallocate freely without collecting more taxes. Thus, for governments with poor institutions, 
foreign aid is likely to be used to benefit the ruling body, while for governments with strong 
democratic institutions, the aid tends to be used to improve the welfare of the citizens (Bueno de 
Mesquita & Smith 2004). 
 
2.2 Donors’ Interests: Political and Strategic Motivations 
Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen (2003) state that aid had not been distributed 
based on neither need nor effectiveness criteria. Aid would have been given to the most 
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impoverished countries that can implement growth-stimulating policies, and have the capacity to 
utilize aid if aid givers follow the aforementioned criteria. Nonetheless, other motivations 
including political, commercial and strategic in nature override the need and effectiveness criteria. 
In addition, several observers, including Alesina and Dollar (2000) have shown that aid giving is 
dependent on political and strategic factors. To be specific, economically close former colonies, 
and politically amicable to its former rulers obtain more foreign aid than other countries with 
comparable income level. In current practice, corrupted governments do not have a tendency to 
receive less aid than honest ones. According to the World Bank statistics, in fact middle income 
countries tend to receive a larger extent of aid than low income countries with the biggest number 
of poor people as shown in Figure 1 below.  
 
[Figure 1] Official Aid Received by Income (Current Million US$)3 
  
Bearce and Tirone (2010) claim that aid can lead to economic development in developing 
countries by catalyzing economic reform only if donors’ strategic motivation for providing aid is 
negligible. When the strategic interests are considerable, aid turns to be ineffective because donor 
                                                 
3 Source: Author using World Bank Data (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD/countries/ZG-XP-
XM?display=graph) 
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governments are likely to loosen their conditions for economic reform. To be specific, Western 
aid was controlled more by strategic causes during the Cold War. It implies that aid was slackly 
related with economic reform. It was after 1990 when the Western governments could put more 
pressure on recipient countries that they would cut aid unless such reform was expected. This 
indicates that aid has supported economic growth to some extent, but it was true only when most 
Western donors moved away from connecting aid provision with strategic benefits. 
 
2.3 Wrong Sector Distributions 
Hubbard and Duggan (2009) drill down the ineffective aid distribution problem to aid 
receiving nations’ domestic sector level. They emphasize the role of the private sector in the 
recipient-state, and argue that more aid should be allocated to more aid effective fields, namely 
the business sector. According to them, charities or programs run by government agencies or 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have never been able to drag people out of poverty, and 
only the business sector can do so because it creates jobs and helps people help themselves, 
leading to sustainable growth. They take the example of India and China that reaped dramatic 
benefits from removing licensing barriers that had impeded the progress of business. Hubbard and 
Duggan do not seek to which nations the aid was distributed, but instead they talk about the 
allocation of aid to the private sector. 
 
2.4 Remedies Suggested for Better Aid Effectiveness  
Jeffrey Sachs’ “Big Push” is one of many recommendations for enhanced aid effectiveness. 
He calls for financial shock therapy in his highly acclaimed book, The End of Poverty (Sachs 
2005). The Big Push debate claims that aid as a major catalyst for investment that would result in 
economic growth. Shock therapy, Sachs insists, can eliminate extreme poverty by 2025 for the 
poorest billion in the world. Nevertheless, fifty years of historical evidence indicate that the Big 
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Push remedy does not work as the theory in practice as shown in figure 2.   
 
[Figure 2] Aid and Growth in Africa 1970 – 2000 (10-year moving average)4 
 
 
Furthermore, William Easterly tackles Sachs’ claim in that the Big Push theory is just 
periodically recycled since the concept was initiated in Lord Hailey’s African survey (1938) for 
the Committee of the African Research for the British government. Likewise, the Big Push policy 
has not led to any material changes in Africa during this period. Degnbol-Martinussen and 
Engberg-Pedersen (2003) challenge the macroeconomic approach as well, asserting that aid has 
just replaced domestic savings and investment rather than supplementing the local economy.  
Meanwhile, Hubbard Duggan (2009) put a great emphasis on the role of the private sector 
in the aid recipient-state, and insist that aid should be distributed to a large extent to foster local 
business, as we saw with the Marshall Plan of 1948–1951 that made loans to private companies in 
Europe. The government receiving aid had to enforce business-friendly policies to ensure that 
their local businesses were able to take advantage of the loan, as they would later repay the loan. 
Hubbard and Duggan rebut the conventional wisdom surrounding the Marshall Plan that it 
brought revival to Europe by funding infrastructure. Instead, they claim that that the Marshall Plan 
worked successfully because it first lent money to businesses, which were then repaid to a 
                                                 
4 Erixon, Fredrik. "Why Aid Doesn't Work." BBC News. September 11, 2005. Accessed July 17, 2014. 
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national budget to build commercial infrastructure. This in turn suggests that a similar method can 
be applied to developing countries at present.  
Fortunately, countries have begun to acknowledge the significance of business climate in 
developing countries. For example, the United Kingdom's International Development Secretary 
recently announced that Britain is to devote £1.8 billion to make it easier to do business in 
developing countries in 2015–2016.5 The Department for International Development (DFID), 
responsible for administering overseas aid of the United Kingdom, has helped streamline the 
business registration process in Bangladesh. As a result, the start-up duration was cut from 35 
days to 1 day and it can now be finished online. It is reported that more than 19,000 new 
enterprises were created in two years and further simplifications of administration are estimated 
for business to save $30 million.6 DFID empirically proved that to enforce policies that make 
business sector work is one of the best remedies to catalyze economic growth and reduce poverty.  
 
2.5 What Needs to Be Discovered More  
There are many previous findings on the relationship between a recipient-government’s 
general policies and institutions and aid effectiveness. There are not, however, many studies that 
specifically shine the spotlight on using the business regulation of aid recipients as a major 
criterion of donor countries when select the aid destination. Therefore, this study tries to find out 
the relationship between the aid-receiving country’s business climates and aid allocation through 
various empirical tests. The most recently available data will be used in this study when carrying 
out the quantitative analysis.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Tran, Mark. "UK to Boost Aid for Business in Poor Countries to £1.8bn." The Guardian. January 27, 2014. 
Accessed November 25, 2014. 
6 "Helping Developing Countries to Remove Barriers to Trade and Investment." GOV.UK. November 23, 2014. 
Accessed November 13, 2014. 
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III. METHODOLOTY AND DATA 
 
 
3.1 Methodology 
The specification of the model for this study is illustrated as follows:  
 
Aidit = α0 + β1GDPpercapitait+ β2GDPpercapita2it+ β3InfantMortalityit + 
β4InfantMortality2it + β5Civil / PoliticalRights + β6GovernmentEffectiveness 
+ β7Populationit+ β8Population2it+β9DoingBusiness + ui+ εit 
 
The dependent variable, Aidit, is the amount of ODA flow for recipient country i in year t. 
The intercept α0 indicates a common component to all recipient countries; ui are unobserved 
random variables that follow a probability distribution; and εit represents an idiosyncratic error 
term. Heteroskedasticity in error terms was detected by the Breusch-Pagan test, and was corrected 
with robust option. In addition, this study adopts random-effects estimators because the Hausman 
tests favors the random-effects model over the fixed-effects model.  
Even though this study espouses Bandyopadhyay and Wall’s (2007) approach, it differs and 
improves on the existing literature on three major accounts: First, this study more narrowly 
focuses on the level of business-favorable climate of aid receiving countries as a major criterion of 
donor countries when selecting the aid destination. This is in contrast with the previous model 
which only took recipient-government’s effectiveness, which is broader than mine, as a main 
variable. Second, more recent time series data (2007–2012) are able to be examined, which 
represent a more valid estimation, so the result should provide more insight into understanding the 
current aid giving practice especially after Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the 
subsequent Accra Agenda for Action (2008). Last, the random-effects estimation is adopted while 
Bandyopadhyay took the fixed-effects approach. As the random-effects approach does not need 
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dummy variables, it enjoys less loss of degree of freedom than the fixed-effects estimation.  
 
3.2 Data 
The empirical work of this study is based on the data of 120 countries that belong to low 
income or lower middle income or upper middle income groups, in accordance with the World 
Bank’s classification, for the six-year span from 2007 to 2012. The dependent variable is the total 
amount of ODA commitments from different sources such as multilateral and bilateral, while 
private donation is excluded. GDP per capita, infant mortality rate, government effectiveness, 
population, and civil and political rights are included as dependent variables because it is 
considered that they appropriately represent developing countries’ physical and economic needs, 
and soundness of their policies and institutions.7 If donor countries poverty-efficiently allocate 
aid according to Collier-Dollar’s optimal aid allocation model,8 the coefficient of GDP per capita 
will be negative and the rest of variables that present recipient-states’ need will have positive 
relationships with the allocation. To be specific, the coefficient of population will be positive 
because as population grows, the poor strata will grow, too. The uniqueness of this study is the 
fact that the doing business index is included as a major variable to discover whether aid is 
allocated in consideration of recipient-states’ level of policy—specifically on the countries’ 
business environment—other than the government effectiveness variable. There are many scholars 
who incorporate government effectiveness like Bandyopadhyay (2007) but their measurement of 
government effectiveness is insufficient since they did not take into account government policies 
on business environment. Government effectiveness variable in those studies only captures the 
quality of public and civil service delivery, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and so on. Doing business variable in this study will complement the government effectiveness 
                                                 
7 Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu, and Howard J. Wall. "The Determinants of Aid in the Post-Cold War Era." Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 89(6) (2007): 533-47. 
8  According to Paul Collier and David Dollar (2002), aid should be allocated to countries that suffer from poverty to 
a large extent and have good policy if donors want to reduce poverty effectively. 
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variable by adding a level of government's commitment to boost its business climate.  
The data is obtained from the World Bank. If the ODA is allocated optimally, the 
coefficient of doing business is expected be positive. In addition, squared values of GDP per 
capita, infant mortality and population are added as independent variables under the assumption 
that their relationships with the dependent variable can be quadratic, providing a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between aid and other variables. GDP per capita and ODA 
commitment are denominated in constant 2005 U.S. dollars for a precise comparison. When 
denominated, GDP Deflator (Inflation) provided by the World Bank was used.  
Main sources of the data are from the World Bank database, OECD Stat Extracts, and 
Freedom House. ODA commitment data is sourced from OECD Stat Extracts; GDP per capita, 
infant mortality rate, government effectiveness and population, doing business are obtained from 
the World Bank; and data on civil and political rights from Freedom House. Full details of the 
dataset and summary statistics are attached in Appendix A. 
1) Dependent variable  
The dependent variable of this analysis is total official development assistance flows from 
different sources, including the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members, multilateral 
institutions, and non-DAC countries for recipient country i in year t.  
2) Independent variables 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product, divided by midyear population in constant 2005 
U.S. dollars terms and infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one 
year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. The former indicates aid receiving countries’ 
economic needs and the latter captures their physical and human needs. The aid should consider 
both aspects. Civil liberties and political rights capture the soundness of a country’s institutions 
and policies. This variable is sourced from Freedom House, an independent watchdog 
organization that carries out annual evaluation of freedom in 195 countries and 14 disputed 
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territories.9 They rate each country numerically from 1 to 7 for political and civil rights 
respectively, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free.10 In this study, the two ratings 
for each country are combined. In addition to this, for the convenience of legibility, the ranking 
order is reversed, like what Bandyopadhyay and Wall did, so that the level of rights has a positive 
relationship with the index. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) captures 
the aid-receiving governments’ effectiveness by scoring governments between -2.5 and 2.5 on the 
basis of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies (Kaufmann et al. 2010). 
Population is included as an independent variable to see differences in terms of country size. The 
squared value of population takes population bias into consideration in order to avoid 
misinterpretation of aid allocation per capita that could fall with country size.  
To measure the level of pro-business regulations and economic performance in the private 
sector, the World Bank’s Doing Business index is adopted. According to Okey’s research, the 
doing business index is one of the relevant sources to show economic performance of the private 
sector (Okey 2011). The doing business project, jointly launched by World Bank and International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), has been analyzing the business climate of 189 countries since 2002. 
The project ranks economies from 1 to 189, a lower rank means that the country’s regulation is 
more in favor of business operation. This index is composed of the following ten indicators: 1) 
starting a business, 2) dealing with construction permits, 3) getting electricity, 4) registering 
property, 5) getting credit, 6) protecting investors, 7) paying taxes, 8) trading across borders, 9)  
enforcing contracts, and 10) resolving insolvency.11 The index is one of the standard tools for 
measuring the impact of domestic regulations on business activities. However, the drawback of 
                                                 
9 "Freedom in the World." Freedom House. January 1, 2014. Accessed July 6, 2014. 
10 "Freedom in the World 2013 - Methodology." Freedom House. January 1, 2013. Accessed July 6, 2014. 
11 "Ease of Doing Business and Distance to Frontier." Doing Business 2013. January 1, 2013. Accessed April 17, 
2014. http://www.tfsa.ca/storage/reports/Ease-of-doing-business-and-distance-to-frontier.pdf. 
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the indicator is that it only shows relative rankings. To overcome this weakness, Distance to 
Frontier index data are used in this study. The only differences between the Doing Business index 
and Distance to Frontier index is that the latter is indicated in absolute terms. An economy’s 
distance to frontier is shown numerically between 0 and 100, where 0 represents the worst 
performance and 100 means the frontier. For quantitative analysis of this study, the absolute 
numbers on the aforementioned ten component indicators were evenly averaged for each nation. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
 
This chapter describes the empirical findings of the panel data analysis on which criteria 
donor states’ aid allocation is significantly responsive to. For this study, six years of data (2007-
2012) were collected from 120 recipient countries. After getting rid of observations that miss 
some data, 714 observations are incorporated in the analysis. The sample statistics for all variables 
are shown in Table 1. The mean country received $543 million per year in ODA while the median 
countries Guatemala and Togo received only $337 million and $334 million respectively.12 This 
skewness signifies that ODA commitment was not equally distributed. There were 17 countries 
that received aid more than $1 billion annually and the top five were India ($3,989 million), 
Afghanistan ($3,760 million), Bangladesh ($2,238 million), Vietnam ($2,144 million), and Iraq 
($2,007 million). The top 17 aid receiving countries out of 120 countries accounted for 48.5 
percent of the accumulated total ODA commitments during the sample years. More detailed 
information is provided in Appendix C.  
 
                                                 
12 In Bandyopadhyay and Wall’s findings (2007), there were 13 countries that received more than $1 billion in aid 
per year, the top five of which were China, Poland, Congo, Indonesia, and Russia. Poland and Russia were not 
observed for this study because only low income, lower middle income, and upper middle income countries were in 
the sample. In this study, it is discovered that China ranked 9th, Indonesia ranked 10th, and Congo ranked 21st in aid. 
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 [Table 1] Sample Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ODA commitments ($m) 714 543.3422 737.5613 4.27 5081.87
GDP per capita ($) 714 2455.923 2341.089 148.1409 13889.95
GDP per capita squared ($) 714 1.15E+07 2.16E+07 21945.73 1.93E+08
Infant mortality (‰) 714 37.78431 25.06761 3.9 112.1
Infant mortality squared (‰) 714 2055.159 2448.292 15.21 12566.41
Civil/Political rights  714 8.298319 3.266442 2 14
Government effectiveness 714 -0.50867 0.589296 -1.77376 1.24741
Population 714 4.47E+07 1.65E+08 20118 1.35E+09
Population squared 714 2.92E+16 2.08E+17 4.05E+08 1.82E+18
Doing business 714 51.92081 10.43387 25.95 79.28
 
To see whether variables are correlated or not, a correlation matrix was deployed in Table 2 
below. It is indicated that all the squared values are highly correlated with their initial value but 
squared values are not excluded in the estimation in order to find out if they have quadratic 
relationships between the dependent variable. Furthermore, no errors occurred with the squared 
variables while running panel regressions.  
 
[Table 2] Correlation Matrix 
 
ODA 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP per 
capita sq 
Infant 
Mortality
Infant 
Mortality 
sq 
Civil/ 
Political 
rights 
Gov. 
effectiveness Population 
Population 
sq 
Doing 
business
ODA 1.0000          
GDP per capita -0.2576 1.0000         
GDP per capita 
sq -0.1910 0.9158 1.0000        
Infant 
Mortality 0.1782 -0.5938 -0.4107 1.0000       
Infant 
Mortality sq 0.1354 -0.4939 -0.3362 0.9638 1.0000      
Civil/Political 
rights -0.1690 0.4036 0.3152 -0.3723 -0.3563 1.0000     
Gov. 
effectiveness -0.0515 0.5713 0.4370 -0.6010 -0.5636 0.4935 1.0000    
 16 
Population 0.4781 -0.0387 -0.0473 -0.0308 -0.0361 -0.0757 0.1292 1.0000   
Population sq 0.3916 -0.0270 -0.0408 -0.0436 -0.0482 -0.0670 0.1254 0.9754 1.0000  
Doing business -0.0708 0.4992 0.3529 -0.6751 -0.6546 0.4201 0.7131 0.0020 -0.0044 1.0000 
 
 
Heterostkedasticity in error terms was detected by the Breusch-Pagan test and it was 
corrected with robust option while no serial correlation problem was discovered by the 
Wooldridge test. More detailed information is provided in Appendix D and Appendix E. In 
addition, ODA commitment and doing business indicators may be potentially endogenous. To test 
if there is an endogeneity issue, Durbin-Wu-Hausman test as performed and concluded that doing 
business variable is truly exogenous. 
 
4.1  Least Squares Estimation  
Table 3 presents the results of least squares estimation. The coefficients that are 
significantly different from zero at least at the 10% level are highlighted in bold. Except for 
government effectiveness, the rest of the variables are positively or negatively associated with 
ODA commitments. In this linear regression analysis, GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared, 
infant mortality, population, population squared, and doing business climate are significantly 
associated with ODA commitments at the 10 percent level or less. Above all, it is found that 
donors care about how well business policy is being enforced by aid receiving governments. In 
practice, developed countries tend to give more aid to those which have a better business climate. 
Second, we see that donors are mainly responsive to the developing countries’ economic needs 
(GDP per capita), physical needs (infant mortality). If the infant mortality rate is too high, 
however, the aid allocation is decreased. Third, the results indicate that aid tends to be more 
allocated to bigger countries (population) but only finitely. The population squared variable is 
negatively associated with ODA commitments as shown in the table. In other words, not always 
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the biggest ones receive most aid. Fourth, developing countries that enjoy higher level of civil and 
political rights receive less aid. Lastly, government effectiveness is not considered much by 
donors when distribute aid and this practice is not accordant with the ideal aid allocation model 
claimed by Burnside and Dollar (2000). 
 
[Table 3] Least Squares Estimation Results 
 
Dependent Variable = ODA commitments 
Independent Variables Coefficient. Robust Standard Error        P> |t| 
GDP per capita -0.1383*** 0.021977  0.000 
GDP per capita squared 8.67E-06*** 1.77E-06  0.000 
Infant mortality 8.191839*** 2.448101  0.001 
Infant mortality squared -0.05916** 0.024715  0.017 
Civil/Political rights -12.4518* 7.109447  0.080 
Government effectiveness 44.95901 50.12275  0.370 
Population 8.29E-06*** 7.73E-07  0.000 
Population squared -5.06E-15*** 6.10E-16  0.000 
Doing business 7.483128*** 2.305305  0.001 
_cons 110.0425 163.5902  0.501 
Note: Heteroskedasticity of error terms is corrected with robust stander errors. *** (**,*) indicates 
statistical significance at the 1(5,10) per cent level. 
 
There are some limitations on the least squares estimation because it is valid only on many 
assumptions such as error terms’ homostkedasticity, no serial correlation between the error terms, 
and explanatory variables’ exogeneity. If any of above assumptions are violated, least squares 
estimation will not effectively estimate the results. Even though the heteroskedasticity was 
corrected, still the validity of those assumptions needs to be verified and the most preferred model 
should be correctly used for more accurate estimation.  
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4.2 Hausman Specification Test  
Since there are some limitations on the least squares estimation, either fixed or random 
effects models is also applied for more efficient panel data estimation. To decide between fixed or 
random effects, the Hausman test was carried out. As shown in the table 4 below, the alternative 
hypothesis for the Hausman specification test is rejected. In other words, it is concluded that the 
difference in coefficients is not systematic. Thus, the random effects model is suitable for this 
study.  
[Table 4] Hausman Specification Test Results 
Dependent Variable = ODA commitments 
  ------ Coefficients ------ 
   (b)     (B)    (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
Independent Variables    FE     RE     Difference Standard error 
GDP per capita -0.05805 -0.0883 0.030255 0.029164
GDP per capita squared 2.00E-06 4.21E-06 -2.21E-06 1.93E-06
Infant mortality 9.443289 8.817759 0.62553 2.794978
Infant mortality squared -0.07861 -0.07446 -0.00415 0.03175
Civil/Political rights -16.7735 -12.0861 -4.68735 6.848218
Government effectiveness -13.3681 8.397544 -21.7656 41.24885
Population 6.56E-06 7.38E-06 -8.22E-07 7.53E-07
Population squared -3.75E-15 -4.35E-15 5.97E-16 1.96E-15
Doing business 4.515217 5.162344 -0.64713 2.038963
                                  b = consistent under H0 and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
                            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under H0; obtained from xtreg 
 
     
 Test: H0: difference in coefficients not systematic 
    chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
          =        1.69 
    Prob>chi2 =     0.9459 
 
4.3 Random-Effects Estimation 
Table 5 illustrates the comparison of random-effects estimation and the least squares 
estimation. The coefficients that are significantly different from zero at least at the 10% level are 
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highlighted in bold. GDP per capita squared, infant mortality, government effectiveness and doing 
business variables are positively related while GDP per capita, infant mortality squared, civil and 
political rights, and population squared have a negative association with the dependent variable. 
Also, there are some major differences in the results between the two analyses: GDP per capita 
squared, civil and political rights, and doing business. The least squared regression results indicate 
that those three variables are statistically significant but the random-effects estimation does not. 
To decide which estimation to take, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random 
effects was run. The test result concluded that there are significant differences across countries. 
Namely, the data have panel effects, meaning that the random-effects estimation overrides least 
squares estimation. The detailed test results are provided in Appendix F.  
 
[Table 5] Comparason of Random-effects and Least Squares Estimation 
      Random Effects 
  Least Squares 
ODA commitments  Coefficient (Standard error)    P>z 
   Coefficient 
 (Robust Standard error)
    
P>t 
GDP per capita -0.0883**(0.037792) 0.019 
-0.1383*** 
(0.0219766) 0.000 
GDP per capita squared 4.21E-06(2.92E-06) 0.149 
8.67E-06*** 
(1.77E-06) 0.000 
Infant mortality 8.817759*(4.586697) 0.055 
8.191839*** 
(2.448101) 0.001 
Infant mortality squared -0.07446*(0.044682) 0.096 
-0.05916** 
(0.024715) 0.017 
Civil/Political rights -12.0861(9.501979) 0.203 
-12.4518* 
(7.109447) 0.080 
Government effectiveness 8.397544(64.04732) 0.896 
44.95901 
(50.12275) 0.370 
Population 7.38E-06***(8.49E-07) 0.000 
8.29E-06*** 
(7.73E-07) 0.000 
Population squared -4.35E-15***(6.92E-16) 0.000 
-5.06E-15*** 
(6.10E-16) 0.000 
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Doing business 5.162344(3.384156) 0.127 
7.483128*** 
(2.305305) 0.001 
_cons 162.534(260.9125) 0.533 
110.0425 
(163.5902) 0.501 
Note: *** (**,*) indicates statistical significance at the 1(5, 10) per cent level. 
 
First, regarding the doing business environment, the random-effects model signifies that 
donor states do not consider much about the recipients’ climate for business as a determinant of 
aid level. Such results show that the current aid practice is not poverty efficient. If the aid 
allocation is poverty efficient enough, more aid should have been allocated to those recipient 
states that have higher levels of business favorable policies because pro-business policies lead to a 
vibrant private sector development and the vibrant private sector drives economic growth that will 
eventually eradicate poverty.  
Second, GDP per capita is negatively associated with the amount of ODA commitments in 
both estimations. It is interpreted that donor states are strongly responsive to the recipient states’ 
economic need. This result confirms Wall’s finding that countries with lower per capita GDP tend 
to receive correspondingly greater shares of aid (Wall 1995).  
Third, infant mortality is positively related with total ODA commitments. This finding 
signifies developing countries’ physical and human needs are taken into consideration when donor 
countries select where to give aid. Nonetheless, if the infant mortality rate goes too high, the ODA 
commitments decreased as shown in the sign of infant mortality squared coefficient. Such practice 
does not align with the theoretical aid allocation principle in that more aid should have been 
allocated to countries where human development is urgently needed due to extremely high infant 
mortality rates.  
Fourth, the coefficient of the index of civil liberty and political rights is not significant. 
Notwithstanding it is statistically insignificant, it is still noticeable that the sign of the variable is 
opposite to expectation. The result weakens the claim of Neumayer that countries which put a 
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higher value on political and civil rights receive more aid (Neumayer 2003).  
 Fifth, the government effectiveness index is highly insignificant. This undermines the 
findings on policy selectivity by Dollar and Levin (Dollar and Levin 2004). They argue that aid 
agencies for 1984–2002 have allocated more aid towards countries with good institutions and 
policies. However, more recent panel data analysis revealed that aid giving practice retrogressed 
to 1984 – 1989 period when aid was allocated irrespective of good governance.  
Lastly, the relationship of donors’ assistance and population is significantly different from 
zero. This result indicates that aid tends to be more allocated to bigger countries in size. As bigger 
countries generally have more population living in poverty, donors’ responsiveness to population 
is above criticism. It is also found that the biggest developing countries do not necessarily receive 
more aid since the population squared variable has a statistically significant negative sign. It is 
reasonable because the top biggest countries, such as China, India and Brazil, would have been 
allocated most aid resources otherwise. 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
 
The investigations through economic panel data estimation show that the recent aid practice 
during period 2007–2012 has not much changed from the past practice that focused mostly on the 
recipients’ needs–generally represented by income level, infant mortality and population–rather 
than considering the aid’s value for money or appropriate allocation in accordance with the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). As Accra 
Agenda for Action declared that respect for human rights is one of the core elements for achieving 
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impact on lives in developing countries13, donors must not turn a blind eye to the status of human 
rights in aid-recipient countries. The finding regarding the government effectiveness is 
inconsistent with Burnside and Dollar’s claim that aid should be allocated more to countries with 
sound policies and institutions, because aid has a positive effect for growth only in those countries.  
Do countries with more business-friendly environments receive more aid? To the question, 
the main focus of this study, the answer is no. The hypothesis of this study was rejected by the 
empirical analysis so it concludes that the “doing business” variable is not statistically significant 
in the allocation of aid. The result is somewhat disappointing to those who believe that the 
favorable doing business climate should play an important role in the allocation of aid.  
The policy implication of this paper is that donor states should recognize private sector 
developments are essential to a recipient country's economic prosperity, and consider the 
soundness of polices on business as a critical criterion when selecting where to give aid. By 
considering business climate as a major selectivity factor, donor countries will contribute to better 
aid effectiveness. What is more, donor countries should deliberately design the way of support to 
strengthen the business policies and regulations for recipient countries. 
This study can be improved in several ways. The model in this study can become more 
sophisticated by building an ‘aid allocation–business climate–growth’ relationship specification 
but the direct relationship between the business climate and economic growth is not analyzed due 
to methodological issues. Moreover, the relationship between aid allocation and doing business 
can be elaborated by testing each sub-category of the variables. The relative importance of the 
sub-category may vary. On this account, the more detailed relationship between aid allocation and 
                                                 
13 Accra Agenda for Action (2008): Ministers of developing and donor countries responsible for promoting 
development and Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions endorsed the Accra Agenda for Action 
(AAA) in Accra, Ghana, on 4 September 2008 to accelerate and deepen implementation of the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness(2005). In doing so, developing countries committed to taking control of their own future, donors 
pledged to co-ordinate better amongst themselves, and all agreed to be more accountable to each other – and to their 
citizens. (OECD) 
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doing business sub-categories, such as starting a business, getting credit, and protecting investors, 
can be discovered separately. 
 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 25 
APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES 
 
Variable Source Description Source URL 
Inflation, GDP 
deflator (annual %) 
World Bank Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate 
of the GDP implicit deflator shows the rate of 
price change in the economy as a whole.  
http://data.worldban
k.org/indicator/NY.
GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG
GDP per capita World Bank GDP per capita is gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum 
of gross value added by all resident producers in 
the economy plus any product taxes and minus 
any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. 
http://data.worldban
k.org/indicator/NY.
GDP.PCAP.KD 
ODA Commitments OECD Commitments are considered to be made at the 
date a loan or grant agreement is signed or the 
obligation is otherwise made known to the 
recipient. ODA commitments include grants, 
capital subscriptions, associated financing and 
technical cooperation. 
http://stats.oecd.org
/viewhtml.aspx?dat
asetcode=TABLE3
A&lang=en 
Infant Mortality 
Rates 
World Bank Infant mortality rate is the number of infants 
dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 
live births in a given year. 
http://data.worldban
k.org/indicator/SP.
DYN.IMRT.IN 
Civil and political 
rights 
Freedom 
House 
Political rights ratings are based on an 
evaluation of three subcategories: electoral 
process, political pluralism and participation, 
and functioning of government. Civil liberties 
ratings are based on an evaluation of four 
subcategories: freedom of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights, rule of 
law, and personal autonomy and individual 
rights. 
http://www.freedo
mhouse.org/report/f
reedom-world-
2013/methodology#
.U7j-Efl_tAo 
Government 
Effectiveness 
World Bank Government Effectiveness captures perceptions 
of the quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies.  
http://data.worldban
k.org/data-
catalog/worldwide-
governance-
indicators 
Population World Bank Total population counts all residents regardless 
of legal status or citizenship - except for 
refugees not permanently settled in the country 
of asylum.  
http://databank.worl
dbank.org/data/vie
ws/reports/tablevie
w.aspx?isshared=tr
ue 
Doing Business 
Index 
World Bank The doing business index provides objective 
measures of business regulations and their 
enforcement across 189 economies and selected 
cities at the subnational and regional level. 
http://www.doingbu
siness.org/data/dista
nce-to-frontier 
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APPENDIX B: COUNTRIES OBSERVED 
1 Afghanistan  50 Indonesia  99 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
2 Albania  51 Iran, Islamic Rep.  100 Sudan 
3 Algeria  52 Iraq  101 Suriname 
4 Angola  53 Jordan  102 Swaziland 
5 Armenia  54 Kazakhstan  103 Syrian Arab Republic 
6 Azerbaijan  55 Kenya  104 Tajikistan 
7 Bangladesh  56 Kiribati  105 Tanzania 
8 Belarus  57 Kyrgyz Republic  106 Thailand 
9 Belize  58 Lao PDR  107 Timor-Leste 
10 Bhutan  59 Lebanon  108 Togo 
11 Bolivia  60 Lesotho  109 Tonga 
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina  61 Liberia  110 Tunisia 
13 Botswana  62 Macedonia, FYR  111 Turkey 
14 Brazil  63 Madagascar  112 Uganda 
15 Burkina Faso  64 Malawi  113 Ukraine 
16 Burundi  65 Malaysia  114 Uzbekistan 
17 Cambodia  66 Maldives  115 Vanuatu 
18 Cameroon  67 Mali  116 Venezuela, RB 
19 Cabo Verde  68 Marshall Islands  117 Vietnam 
20 Central African Republic  69 Mauritania  118 Yemen, Rep. 
21 Chad  70 Mauritius  119 Zambia 
22 China  71 Mexico  120 Zimbabwe 
23 Colombia  72 Micronesia, Fed. Sts.    
24 Comoros  73 Moldova    
25 Congo, Dem. Rep.  74 Mongolia    
26 Congo, Rep.  75 Montenegro    
27 Costa Rica  76 Morocco    
28 Cote d'Ivoire  77 Mozambique    
29 Djibouti  78 Namibia    
30 Dominica  79 Nepal    
31 Dominican Republic  80 Nicaragua    
32 Ecuador  81 Niger    
33 Egypt, Arab Rep.  82 Nigeria    
34 El Salvador  83 Pakistan    
35 Eritrea  84 Palau    
36 Ethiopia  85 Panama    
37 Fiji  86 Papua New Guinea    
38 Gabon  87 Paraguay    
39 Gambia, The  88 Peru    
40 Georgia  89 Philippines    
41 Ghana  90 Rwanda    
42 Grenada  91 Samoa    
43 Guatemala  92 Senegal    
44 Guinea  93 Serbia    
45 Guinea-Bissau  94 Seychelles    
46 Guyana  95 Solomon Islands    
47 Haiti  96 South Africa    
48 Honduras  97 Sri Lanka    
49 India  98 St. Lucia    
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APPENDIX C: ODA COMMITMENTS AND THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
 
These plots illustrate the simple correlations between ODA commitments (the dependent variable) 
and independent variables as well as the distribution of the values of six independent variables. 
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APPENDIX D: TOP ODA RECEIVED COUNTRIES 
 
(2005 constant U.S. million $) 
Ranking Country 
Year Total 
Sum 
Annual 
Average
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1 India 3,896.22  4,127.26 2,782.37 5,081.87 3,877.52 4,170.48  23,935.72 3,989.29 
2 Afghanistan 2,851.38  3,741.02 4,020.96 4,518.49 3,791.53 3,639.37  22,562.75 3,760.46 
3 Bangladesh 1,830.28  2,751.11 1,777.49 1,847.66 3,517.35 1,704.86  13,428.75 2,238.13 
4 Vietnam 1,863.61  1,698.95 2,642.14 1,776.41 2,703.09 2,179.88  12,864.08 2,144.01 
5 Iraq 3,666.82  5,061.75 1,188.88 903.47 563.29 658.51  12,042.72 2,007.12 
6 Tanzania 2,093.14  2,096.27 2,847.64 2,013.92 1,426.75 1,488.94  11,966.66 1,994.44 
7 Kenya 1,679.49  882.40 1,855.50 2,116.49 2,020.33 2,675.18  11,229.39 1,871.57 
8 Mozambique 1,125.36  1,632.43 1,476.42 1,885.62 1,277.15 3,211.30  10,608.28 1,768.05 
9 China 2,317.37  1,742.95 1,884.95 1,712.20 1,142.20 1,302.24  10,101.91 1,683.65 
10 Indonesia 1,683.27  1,951.60 1,718.07 1,404.95 818.07 649.98  8,225.94 1,370.99 
11 Ethiopia 1,210.84  1,296.61 1,632.42 1,278.38  985.04 1,716.08  8,119.37 1,353.23 
12 Uganda 1,418.43  1,478.83 1,685.73 1,449.56 1,008.42 1,058.04  8,099.01 1,349.84 
13 Turkey 605.96  916.78 795.66 1,068.27 2,011.51 2,508.41   7,906.59 1,317.77 
14 Palau  30.87   28.43 2,301.42 2,139.82 1,325.35 1,689.88  7,515.77 1,252.63 
15 Cote d'Ivoire 413.70  579.17 2,042.54 676.31 1,300.63 2,285.41  7,297.76 1,216.29 
16 Cameroon 1,937.40  1,022.27 959.68 687.42 857.07 884.38   6,348.22 1,058.04 
17 Egypt  906.16  1,020.98 645.33 1,318.75 687.90 1,434.96  6,014.08 1,002.35
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APPENDIX E: BREUSCH-PAGAN TEST FOR HETEROSCADASTICITY 
 
 
 
 
 
To identify whether the error terms are homeskedastic or not, Breusch-Pagan test is conducted. 
The null hypothesis for the test is rejected at the level of 1 per cent, which concludes that the error 
terms are heteroskedastic. 
 
 
H0: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of ODA Commitment 
chi2(1)      =   147.99 
Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
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APPENDIX F: WOOLDBRIDGE TEST FOR SERIAL CORRELATION  
 
 
 
 
It is normally said that serial correlation tests apply to macro panels with long time series, over 
20–30 years. Therefore, it would not be a problem in this study with 6-year span of panel data. As 
seen in the Wooldridge test results, it fails to reject the null and conclude the data does not have 
first-order autocorrelation.  
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1, 119)  =      2.697 
        Prob > F  =      0.1032 
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APPENDIX G: BREUSCH AND PAGAN LAGRANGIAN MULTIPLIER TEST 
 
ODA commitments [country,t] = Xb + u[country] + e[country,t] 
  
      Var        sd = sqrt(Var) 
ODA commitments 543996.7 737.5613  
          e 110116.7 331.8384  
          u 225197.4 474.5496  
 
Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                              chi2(1) =   758.33 
                           Prob > chi2 =     0.0000 
 
The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test help decide between a random-effects 
estimation and a simple OLS regression. The results reject the null and conclude that the random-
effects estimation is appropriate for this study.  
 
 32 
APPENDIX H: RANDOM-EFFECTS GLS REGRESSION 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                                Number of obs =            714 
Group variable: country                                    Number of groups =            120 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1516                                  Obs per group: min =              2 
      between = 0.4762                                               avg =             6.0 
       overall = 0.4125                                               max =              6 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                                   Wald chi2(9) =              . 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                               Prob > chi2  =               . 
 
ODA commitments    Coefficient       Standard error        z        P>z 
GDP per capita -0.0883** 0.037792 -2.34 0.019 
GDP per capita squared 4.21E-06 2.92E-06 1.44 0.149 
Infant mortality 8.817759* 4.586697 1.92 0.055 
Infant mortality squared -0.07446* 0.044682 -1.67 0.096 
Civil/Political rights -12.0861 9.501979 -1.27 0.203 
Government effectiveness 8.397544 64.04732 0.13 0.896 
Population 7.38E-06*** 8.49E-07 8.7 0.000 
Population squared -4.35E-15*** 6.92E-16 -6.28 0.000 
Doing business 5.162344 3.384156 1.53 0.127 
_cons 162.534 260.9125 0.62 0.533 
sigma_u 474.54963
sigma_e 331.83844
rho .6716012  (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
Note: *** (**,*) indicates statistical significance at the 1(5, 10) per cent level. 
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